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Make-Believe: The Rules Excluding




Article IV of the Federal Rules of Evidence includes several
rules that prohibit the use of specified types of information as evi-
dence of particular propositions. Subsequent remedial measures are
inadmissible to prove negligence (but admissible to show ownership,
control, et cetera),' settlement offers are inadmissible to prove liabil-
ity (but admissible to show bias or prejudice, or for other purposes),2
and so forth. Any exclusion of relevant evidence involves some dis-
tortion of reality in the sense that the picture presented to the trier of
fact includes less information than the available total. That will be
true whether the evidence is kept out by these special exclusionary
rules, or by exclusionary rules intended to protect privacy or confi-
dentiality,3 or by rules that exclude evidence because it may be unre-
liable4 or because it may confuse, mislead, or unfairly prejudice the
jury.5 Distortion in this general sense is not necessarily bad. It can
serve general social goals, make trials more efficient, and improve the
accuracy of fact-finding by focusing attention on relevant issues and
probative evidence. Distortion of this unavoidable sort is not the
type of effect that I hope to describe in this paper.
When we exclude evidence that the defendant in a civil law suit
offered to settle the claim for $100,000, that does distort the jury's
* Professor, the University of Michigan Law School. This Article has benefited
greatly from comments and suggestions from the participants at the Symposium, Truth
and Its Rivals: Evidence Reform and the Goals of Evidence Law, at Hastings College of
the Law, September 1997, and from research assistance by Tracy Thompson and Brian
Donadio. The research was supported by funds from the Cook Endowment of the Uni-
versity of Michigan Law School.
1. See FED. R. EvID. 407. All references to "rule" and "rules" in the text refer to
the Federal Rules of Evidence.
2. See FED. R. EvID. 408.
3. See FED. R. EVID. 501 (regarding privileges). See also Jaffe v. Redmond, 518
U.S. 1 (1996) (holding confidential communication between patient and psychotherapist,
including licensed social worker in course of psychotherapy, privileged from compelled
disclosure under FED. R. EVID. 501); Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40 (1980)
(holding that privilege against adverse spousal testimony vests only in witness spouse who
may neither be compelled to testify nor foreclosed from testifying).
4. See FED. R. EVID. 801-802 (hearsay).
5. See FED. R. EVID. 403.
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view of the case. A juror who hears about this offer after voting for a
defense verdict might wonder if her decision was wrong. But this ex-
clusion does not alter the jury's view of what the trial is really about,
and it is not based on a distorted view of how trials are conducted; it
merely limits the moves the plaintiff can make. In this case the limi-
tation is simple and sensible. The parties attempted to resolve their
dispute by other means, and failed; that's over, and should have no
bearing on the trial they are now conducting in court. I don't mean
to minimize the importance of settlements. They are our major
method of resolving disputes; trials are rare exceptions.6 But when a
trial does occur, information about the settlement process can be ig-
nored without pretending that the trial is something that it's not.
Other Article IV rules, however, entail more basic distortions. I
will focus on two: rule 404, which concerns character evidence, and
rule 411, which deals with liability insurance. Rule 404, I claim, ex-
presses a fundamentally false view of the content of common-law tri-
als, while rule 411 embodies an equally basic misrepresentation of the
context of personal-injury litigation.
1. Character Evidence
The rules governing character evidence are famously compli-
cated and controversial. The basic rule sounds simple enough:
Evidence of a person's character or a trait of character is not admis-
sible for the purpose of Proving action in conformity therewith on a
particular occasion ....
But as usual, there are exceptions and exclusions-for this rule, quite
a few. A criminal defendant may present evidence of his own charac-
ter8 or that of the alleged victim,' in the form of opinion or reputation
evidence,1" to prove conduct in conformity with that character trait-
and the prosecutor may rebut such evidence." Character evidence of
various sorts may be used to impeach a witness. 2 Recently, Congress
carved out a plenary exception for character evidence in sexual as-
sault and child molestation cases. 3 And, of course, evidence that is
inadmissible for "character" or "propensity" purposes may be used
6. See, e.g., Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Don't Try: Civil Jury Verdicts in a
System Geared to Settlement, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1,2 (1996).
7. FED. R. EVID. 404(a).
8. See FED. R. EvID. 404(a)(1).
9. See FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(2).
10. See FED. R. EvID. 405(a). Specific instances of relevant conduct may be ex-
plored on cross examination. See id.
11. See FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(1) and (2).
12. See FED. R. EvID. 608 and 609.
13. See FED. R. EVID. 413-415.
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for other purposes:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove
the character of a person in order to show action in conformity
therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such
as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowl-
edge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident .... 14n
The rules governing character evidence are probably the most
litigated of all rules of evidence. They are widely criticized as com-
plicated, arbitrary, and poorly understood. Specifically, among other
points, critics argue that:
* Character evidence that is admitted for impeachment will in-
evitably be used for propensity, 5 especially when it's evi-
dence of prior convictions by a criminal defendant.16
* The permitted "non-propensity" uses of prior conduct are of-
ten indistinguishable from propensity.'
* Frequently, character evidence that is admitted for ostensibly
"non-propensity" purposes is severely and unfairly prejudi-
cial, especially to criminal defendants.18
* The exceptions for sexual assault and child molestation cases
cannot be reconciled with the general exclusion of propensity
evidence: If a defendant is charged with molesting and kill-
ing a child, does it make sense to admit allegations that he
fondled other children, but exclude a judgment of conviction
for murdering one of them? 9
" The basic rule is bad. Propensity evidence-especially evi-
dence of serious prior misconduct-is too probative to ex-
clude.' °
I will not address any of these arguments, at least not directly.
My point is different in kind, and has no immediate policy implica-
tions. It is that what we regulate as "character evidence" is only a
small part of the evidence and arguments that lawyers use to develop
competing versions of the characters of the actors in the events that
14. FED. R. EvID. 404(b).
15. See, e.g., H. Richard Uviller, Credence, Character and the 'Rules of Evidence:
Seeing Through the Liar's Tale, 42 DuKE L.J. 776, 802-03 (1993).
16. See, e.g., Richard Friedman, Character Impeachment Evidence: Psycho-Bayesian
[!?]Analysis and a Proposed Overhaul, 38 UCLA L. REv. 637 (1991).
17. See, e.g., H. Richard Uviller, Evidence of Character to Prove Conduct: Illusion,
Illogic, and Injustice in the Courtroom, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 845, 877-79 (1982).
18. See, e.g., Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Need to Amend Federal Rule of Evidence
404(b): The Threat to the Future of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 30 VILL. L REV. 1465,
1487-88 (1985).
19. See, e.g., James S. Liebman, Proposed Evidence Rules 413 to 415-Some Prob-
lems and Recommendations, 20 U. DAYTON L. REv. 753,756 (1995).
20. See generally Roger Park, Character at the Crossroads, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 717,721
(1998) (at § II(A)(1)(a)).
Mar. 1998] MAKE-BELIEVE
are subject to litigation. Our character evidence rules are like a law
that claims to regulate hunting by prohibiting the use of rifles for
killing wild animals (but not for butchering tame ones) (and with
several exceptions)-but which never mentions shotguns, pistols,
bows and arrows, dogs, hawks, poison, traps, or snares.
The theory of the character evidence rule is that (subject to ex-
ceptions) the jury is supposed to base its judgment on evidence of
what the relevant actors in the case did, not what sort of people they
are. This distinction is inconsistent with our usual process of reason-
ing. When the question is "Did Emma steal?" we inevitably think
"Would she?" If she's done it before, probably yes; if she never has.
maybe not. This is not a problem of "prejudice" in the sense of bias,
although that too comes up regularly with character evidence.
("Well, maybe she is guilty, but she's a widowed mother.") It's sim-
ply a common, perhaps universal, line of inference that is theoreti-
cally forbidden by common-law rules of evidence. Trial attorneys are
deeply aware of this predilection. If they want to win, they learn to
do everything possible to develop character images that suit their
purposes. What we label "character evidence," however, has little or
nothing to do with this pervasive practice of character development.
Consider the O.J. Simpson criminal case. The defense presented
no "character evidence" about Mr. Simpson, although it was entitled
to do so, but that hardly means they didn't focus on his character as a
person. Perhaps their first public move in that direction was made at
the initial arraignment, when attorney Robert Shapiro asked the
judge, on national television, to order the sheriff's department to
permit Mr. Simpson to use a special pillow, which he produced, that
would provide adequate cervical support.2' The message (to the
world, and to potential jurors): O.J. is an aging man, beset by aches
and pains-no longer a football player, let alone a rampaging killer.
Or consider the opening lines of the defense attorney's opening
statement in the uncelebrated criminal prosecution of Ronald Tellez.
"This is not a case about an attempt[ed] escape in custody. As you
will see, as the evidence is explored in this case.., there was no place
for Ron to go, no place for him to escape to. '"22 Message: The defen-
dant (charged with assaulting an officer and trying to escape from
custody while awaiting trial for capital murder) is an ordinary guy,
"Ron," one of us.
It is only a slight exaggeration to say that almost everything trial
lawyers do is designed, at least in part, to develop the character of
21. Jim Mulvaney, O.J. Pleads Not Guilty; DA Says He Acted Alone, NEWSDAY,
June 21, 1994, at 4.
22. People v. Tellez, No. 87-12500, Circuit Ct., Cook County (Ill.), Jan. 19, 1989
(transcript on file with author).
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one or more of the participants in the events at issue. Parties and
witnesses are told to dress and behave in ways that are appropriate to
the images the lawyers want to convey.23 They are taught to testify
"in character"-to be polite, low key, thoughtful, whatever. Cross
examiners try to get witnesses, especially opposing parties, to lose
control and break from their assigned characters, usually by showing
anger. Family members and friends are recruited to show up and
play supporting roles. When the jury is watching, lawyers treat their
clients in the manner that is appropriate to the characters they want
the jury to see-friendly, intelligent, trusting, respectful-and they
dress and act to convey the impression that they themselves are the
sort of people the jurors can trust. And so forth.
Naturally, the lawyers don't usually say "My client is an honest,
thoughtful, soft-spoken, well-dressed middle-class man, just like
you." Like all good dramatists, they try to show it. Sometimes, how-
ever, the characterization is made explicit by the opposition, to dis-
credit it. Consider, for example, an excerpt from the closing argu-
ment for the defendant in a drug sale case where the defense was
entrapment:
What about Don Howe? On the day this sale took place, he was
not the same clean-cut, well-dressed man that you saw and heard in
this courtroom. In fact, on that day he wasn't even Don Howe. He
was using the name Gene Hall. He was not wearing his coat and tie
then. He had long hair to his shoulders; he was dressed in faded
blue jeans and a dirty sweatshirt; he had a full growth of beard on
his face; he was drinking wine; and, according to the testimony of
Mel Gabe, he had been smoking marijuana. In short, he was doing
everything in his power to win the confidence of these young peo-
ple so he could trap them into allowing him to persuade them to
commit an unlawful act so that he could then come into court and
prosecute them.24
And occasionally we might hear a lawyer with a particularly hard
hand to play argue that his client actually does have a human charac-
ter:
When you were chosen for this jury, you agreed to decide this case
fairly and impartially. Now, I represent a corporation and Mr. Gur-
sky represents an individual. You might think of a corporation as
impersonal, but Memorex consists of people, decent, hard-working
people like Joe and Richard. And those people are counting on you
to give them the same consideration as plaintiff, as I am certain you
23. "Usually, I like my expert [witness] to... wear a tweedy jacket and smoke a pipe
.... " Hyman Hillenbrand, The Effective Use of Expert Witnesses, BRIEF, Fall 1987, at
48,49.
24. JACOB A. STEIN, CLOSING ARGUMENT, THE ART AND THE LAW, § 619, at 693




Why are these character arguments permitted? A skillful advo-
cate could claim that neither of the arguments I quoted is a "propen-
sity" argument. The first can be justified as an attempt to explain
how the undercover agent entrapped the defendants, and the second
as an exhortation to the jury not to be biased against a corporate de-
fendant. But the effect is the same either way. In particular, charac-
ter arguments, whether or not they speak in terms of propensity, can
bias the fact finder by creating sympathy or antipathy; that's usually
the point of making them. Nonetheless, lawyers are permitted to de-
scribe the character of parties and others in highly emotive terms, so
long as the characterizations are plausibly based on evidence con-
cerning conduct that is the subject of the trial. In Williams v. State
the defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment for raping an eight-
year old girl.26 In the course of his argument, the prosecutor said
that the "[d]efendant was under the record the vilest type of charac-
ter known to humanity," that he had "a warped brain, a degenerate
mind," and that he "should be killed just as a person would kill a rat-
tlesnake."27 The appellate court had no difficulty with this: "We
agree with the prosecutor that an adult who would commit the acts
done by the defendant shows that he is 'lowdown, degenerate, and
filthy.' He richly deserves the punishment which he received."28
Williams, no doubt, is an extreme case, but there is no shortage
of less extreme cases in which the court permitted the prosecutor to
describe a criminal defendant as a "professional assassin,"29 a "hired
gun-fighter,"" a "dope pusher,"" an "executioner,"" an "animal,"" a
"punk, 34 a "type of worm,, 35 or a "mad dog."36 To be sure, there are
25. Id. § 303, at 22.
26. 226 P.2d 989, 991 (Okla. Crim. App. 1951).
27. Id. at 997.
28. Id. See also State v. Lang, 66 A. 942, 945 (N.J. 1907) ("the prosecutor was within
his privilege in making the statement [that] the defendant was 'a monster in his passions,
licentious in his desires, beastly in his love, brutal when thwarted and cowardly when
caught."').
29. State v. Hunt, 373 S.E.2d 400, 413 (N.C. 1988), sentence vacated on other grounds,
494 U.S. 1022 (1990).
30. Johnston v. United States, 154 F. 445, 449 (9th Cir. 1907).
31. State v. Prince, 713 S.W.2d 914, 918 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1986).
32. People v. Franklin, 552 N.E.2d 743, 753 (Ill. 1990); People v. Cunningham, 532
N.E.2d 511,517 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988).
33. Williams v. Alabama, 377 So. 2d 634, 639 (Ala. Crim. App. 1979). See also State
v. Craig, 302 S.E.2d 740, 747 (N.C. 1983) (permitting a description of defendants as a
pack of wolves").
34. State v. Canisales, 615 P.2d 9, 10 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980).
35. United States v. Walker, 190 F.2d 481, 484 (2d Cir. 1951).
36. Commonwealth v. Capps, 114 A.2d 338, 342 (Pa. t955); Miller v. Georgia, 177
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cases on the other side in which judgments have been reversed for
very similar arguments: "cheap, scaly, slimy crook, 37 "leech[] off so-
ciety,"38 or "'junkie', 'rat' and a 'sculptor' with a knife., 39 But they
have not been reversed because these arguments violate the charac-
ter evidence rule. Rather, the courts have drawn a weaving, inconsis-
tent, frequently invisible line between statements that are permissibly
harsh, and those that are prejudicially inflammatory.
To be sure, there is a logical distinction at issue. If the claim that
the defendant is "the vilest type of character known to humanity" is
based solely on evidence that he committed the crime with which he
is charged, then to argue that he has this character trait is not to claim
that he acted in accord with that trait on a particular occasion. The
causal inference runs in the opposite direction: Evidence that the de-
fendant committed the crime is the basis for the argument that he is
vile. Ergo, it is not a propensity argument. Q.E.D.
So what? Whether they are "inflammatory" or merely "passion-
ate," these characterizations are designed to arouse the jury. It may
be hard to see why a court would permit a lawyer to make this sort of
emotional appeal-when they are allowed, there is rarely any expla-
nation-but it is easy to understand why a lawyer would want to do it.
It is done in the hope that the anger and horror that are evoked will
drive the jury's judgment before them-which is precisely one of the
arguments regularly voiced against propensity evidence. Further-
more, there is an inferential feedback loop that amounts to a judg-
ment from propensity: "You have convinced me that the evidence
that he committed this vicious crime shows that he is a vicious beast;
and because he is a vicious beast, I am reassured in my conviction
that he committed this vicious crime." This argument is circular, but
that does not mean it has no impact. Most important-backing up a
step-these arguments do speak to character if that term has any con-
sistent meaning. That they are not within the ambit of the character
evidence rule as we apply it says a lot about the real meaning of that
rule.
Odder yet, explicit propensity arguments are regularly tolerated
in contexts in which propensity evidence would be excluded. Here is
an excerpt from the prosecution's summation in the 1935 trial of
Bruno Hauptmann, a German immigrant who was convicted of kid-
napping and murdering the infant son of Charles Lindbergh, the
celebrated aviation pioneer:
[W]hat type of man, what type of man would kill the child of Colo-
S.E.2d 253, 254-55 (1970), sentence vacated on other grounds, 408 U.S. 938 (1972).
37. Volkmor v. United States, 13 F.2d 594,595 (6th Cir. 1926).
38. State v. Owen, 253 P.2d 203,211 (Idaho 1953).
39. People v. Hickman, 312 N.Y.S.2d 644,644 (N.Y. App. Div. 1970).
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nel Lindbergh and Anne Morrow? He wouldn't be an American.
No American gangster and no American racketeer ever sank to the
level of killing babies ....
It had to be a secretive fellow. It had to be a fellow that wouldn't
tell anybody anything. It had to be a fellow that wouldn't tell his
wife about his money, who would conceal the truth from her. It
had to be a fellow that wouldn't trust a bookkeeper, that would
take books and enter every little item, groceries, boats, everything,
himself. It had to be a fellow that could undergo hardship, no ordi-
nary hardship; it had to be a man that you could kill in cold blood
here and he wouldn't tell if he didn't want to-the kind of a fellow
that would stow away on a boat and travel three thousand miles to
sneak into the country in a coal bin, without food, without water, a
man that could undergo that hardship, and when he was appre-
hended in court he would go back again and try it over again.
That's the type of a man ....
[I]t would have to be the type of man that wouldn't think anything
of forsaking his own country and disgracing his own nation; it would
have to be the sort of a fellow that would leave everything behind
and flee and go to another country and another land, a strange
land; it would have to be the type of man that would forsake his
own mother, sixty-five years of age, and run away ....
It is easy to attack the prosecutor's argument in the Hauptmann
trial. The prosecutor makes a blatant and inflammatory appeal to
chauvinistic prejudice. Moreover, some of the evidence on which the
argument is based ought to have been inadmissible for any purpose-
for example, the fact (if true) that Hauptmann left his aged mother
and ran away. But there was no objection, Hauptmann's conviction
was affirmed,4' and he was executed. Maybe the courts would be
more scrupulous today, maybe not. More important, from my point
of view, is that the basic structure of the argument is common. Most
of the facts mentioned by the prosecutor's were admissible for "non-
propensity" purposes: That Hauptmann was an immigrant might
have come in as background evidence when he testified, that he was a
stowaway might have been admissible as prior misconduct relevant to
impeachment, and his secretiveness about money might have been
relevant to explain how he concealed the ransom. None of these
facts would have been admissible as propensity evidence to prove
that he kidnapped and murdered, yet once admitted for other pur-
poses, they were used, without objection, for just that purpose. Take
away the jingoism, and similar things happen in modern American
courts all the time.
40. Prosecution's Closing Argument at TR 4366-4368, State v. Hauptmann, Hunter-
don County Oyer & Terminer Court (1935).
41. See State v. Hauptmann, 180 A. 809, 829 (1935).
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The simplest form of this occurs when otherwise admissible evi-
dence is used by a lawyer for favorable propensity arguments about
the party she represents. For example, in the Tellez case,42 the de-
fendant was himself a former police officer. His lawyer used that fact
in her closing argument, without objection: "The natural instinct of
[anybody] to defend himself, I would think that that gets doubled or
tripled or who knows by a police officer who has for years put his life
on the line defending the public."
No one would argue that a defendant's having been a police offi-
cer is admissible to prove that he is likely to have used force in self-
defense. But once that evidence is before the jury, nobody thinks to
object when a lawyer draws that conclusion.
Similar character arguments are routinely made in other situa-
tions. For instance, in the O.J. Simpson murder trial, his chief de-
fense attorney made the following argument about a witness who
happened to sit next to Mr. Simpson on a plane ride from Chicago to
Los Angeles:
And I thought very interesting about this man, Partridge. Remem-
ber, he's the man who was a patent lawyer who had gone to Har-
vard. And he observed O.J. Simpson on this flight back. He saw
him make these phone calls. He saw his emotional state .... He
wrote notes about what took place-not to publish them. He's a
patent lawyer. So he understood .... 43
Its impossible to claim that evidence that Mr. Partridge is a pat-
ent lawyer, or that he went to Harvard, should be admitted because it
shows that he is a credible witness. Some types of "character evi-
dence" are admissible on credibility, but not this. But once the evi-
dence is in (probably as "background") nobody thinks to object when
a lawyer makes that precise point in argument.
One last example, this one from a leading treatise on closing ar-
gument:
Ladies and gentlemen, I submit to you that the evidence has
shown beyond a reasonable doubt that this young man, Thaddeus
Cydzik, was more than an innocent bystander in this matter not just
in the commission of the armed robbery but in the commission of
the killing. He knew what was going to happen, ladies and gentle-
men. He certainly had a good idea what could happen and I submit
he had a good idea what was in fact going to happen. This is an in-
telligent young man. He was almost a straight A student in high
school, an honor student. He is a young man who has had every-
42. People v. Tellez, No. 87-12500, Circuit Ct., Cook County (Ill.), Jan. 19, 1989
(trasnscript on file with author).
43. Official Transcript Closing Argument by Mr. Cochran at *55, People v. Simpson,




thing placed at his disposal, a good family, a strict family, and a
family that saw to it that he did not have to work when he went to
college. He certainly didn't need money from an armed robbery to
further his education, ladies and gentlemen.
But my point is that this young man was and is a leader, and not a
follower. If you want to believe that this young man followed Don-
ald Paulson in everything he did, then so be it. If you want to be-
lieve that the defendant was directed by someone who had not had
the benefit of a higher education, then so be it. This young man
knew what he was going to do when he went in there. He knew
what could happen during the course of an armed robbery. He
knew that someone could get killed but he just didn't think it would
happen this time. Well, it did. 4
Here, favorable evidence about the defendant is used against
him. The argument is seamless and plausible; it does not sound even
mildly objectionable. And yet, as the italicized portions highlight, it
is in part a propensity argument. Mr. Cydzik is intelligent and able;
he is a leader; therefore he is unlikely to have been an ignorant fol-
lower in this crime.
It is difficult to imagine a similar pattern for the other Article IV
exclusionary rules. Consider a case in which evidence of a subse-
quent repair to a stairway bannister was admitted to show the defen-
dant landlord's control over the place in which the plaintiff was in-
jured. What if the plaintiff's attorney argued to the jury:
You've heard that after this terrible accident Mr. Markman, the
landlord, replaced the old, cracked wooden railings on the stairs
with steel rods. Why would he do that, unless the wooden railings
were dangerous?
Surely that lawyer would be stopped, perhaps even by the court sua
sponte if there was no immediate objection. The argument is a fla-
grant violation of rule 407. But equally flagrant propensity argu-
ments are not stopped; that they undercut rule 404(a) seems to go to-
tally unnoticed. The difference is that evidence and arguments on
subsequent repairs are a small corner of the trial process, easy to
isolate and exclude. "Character" and "propensity" are ubiquitous.
By now, it is commonplace that most successful courtroom advo-
cacy is structured as storytelling rather than logical proof.45 To be ef-
fective, a story must correspond to the jurors' image of what a story
should be,46 an image drawn from the most numerous and vivid sto-
ries they read, hear, and see-which is to say, from fiction. But fic-
tion is different from life, and fictional people are not the same as or-
44. STEIN, supra note 24, § 577, at 583 (emphasis added).
45. See generally Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, A Cognitive Theory of Juror De-
cision-Making: The Story Model, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 519 (1991).
46. See id. at 525-527.
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dinary mortals. In Aspects of the Novel, E.M. Forster examined these
differences. ' Forster paraphrased from a French critic who wrote
under the pseudonym Alain:
What is fictitious in a novel is not so much the story as the method
by which thought develops into action, a method which never oc-
curs in daily life .... History, with its emphasis on external causes,
is dominated by the notion of fatality, whereas there is no fatality in
the novel; there everything is founded on human nature, and the
dominating feeling is of an existence where everything is inten-
tional, even passions and crimes, even misery.'
This peculiar mode of behavior is comprehensible-indeed, ex-
pected-because our relationship to the characters in stories is fun-
damentally different from our relationship to people in the world. As
Forster explained, in his own voice:
We know each other approximately, by external signs, and these
serve well enough as a basis for society and even for intimacy. But
people in a novel can be understood completely by the reader; their
inner as well as their outer life can be exposed. And this is why
they often seem more definite than characters in history, or even
our own friends; we have been told all about them that can be told;
even if they are imperfect or unreal they do not contain any secrets,
whereas our friends do and must mutual secrecy being one of the
conditions of life upon this globe.s
9
We know why fictional people act as they do because we are
told. Their actions are plausible and their stories are compelling
when their motivation is based on their "nature"--their character-
which we also know (because we are told) as we never do in life.
There is a great deal of evidence that most people overestimate the
predictive value of "personality" or "character," that such traits are
not a reliable basis for predicting behavior in life.5° But in stories-fic-
tional stories-character is a strong and reliable predictor of conduct,
by authorial fiat. The ambition of trial lawyers is to achieve that sort
of control in court, to author the courtroom story that carries the day.
To succeed, they work with familiar, proven forms. Their art imitates
47. E.M. FORSTER, ASPECTS OFTHE NOVEL (1927).
48. Id at 46.
49. Id. at 47.
50. See, e.g., Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heu-
ristics and Biases 4-5, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES
(D. Kahneman et al. eds. 1982); JOHN MONAHAN, PREDICTING VIOLENT BEHAVIOR 77
(1981). See generally David P. Leonard, The Use of Character to Prove Conduct: Ration-
ality and Catharsis in the Law of Evidence, 58 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 25-31 (1987); Miguel
A. Mender, California's New Law on Character Evidence: Evidence Code Section 352 and
the Impact of Recent Psychological Studies, 31 UCLA L. REV. 1003, 1041-60 (1984). But
see Susan M. Davies, Evidence of Character to Prove Conduct: A Reassessment of Rele-
vancy, 27 CRIM. L. BULL. 504,518-19 (1991).
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art.
In short, character is central to the task of the trial advocate. As
in fiction, it is more important, more central in court than in life. If
we really excluded character evidence and character argument (or
limited them to their de jure range) we would drain half the fun from
the game. So we do not bother thinking about it, unless a lawyer
crosses a heavily contested line-typically, by insinuating inadmissi-
ble evidence of prior crimes,51 or by transparently arguing propensity
from evidence of prior misconduct that was admitted solely for im-
peachment. 2
II. Liability Insurance
If character is the grain, the texture of trials, insurance-in civil
cases-is the hidden infrastructure. In most civil trials "insurance" is
the real answer to the question: "Who's going to pay?" However, if
that question comes from the jury, the legally correct answer is:
"None of your business." Rule 411 tells us that:
Evidence that a person was or was not insured against liability is
not admissible upon the issue whether the person acted negligently
or otherwise wrongfully. 3
But that's only one part of the rule of exclusion. The question that ju-
ries might really care about is one they are not allowed even to ask:
"If we do find that the defendant was negligent, will she have to pay
or will some big insurance company cover the damages?"
54
Like Rule 404, Rule 411 was not an innovation when the Federal
Rules of Evidence went into effect in 1975. It may be an exaggera-
tion to claim that it is "one of the oldest enduring doctrines in
American jurisprudence, 55 but excluding evidence of insurance was,
and remains, a well-established practice. Unlike Rule 404, however,
Rule 411 has not been amended56 or modified by the enactment of
other rules. Before and after codification, this exclusion has been
comparatively uncontroversial-at least in court. Almost all judges
51. See, e.g., People v. Mejias, 420 N.Y.S.2d 737 (1979). People v. Wright, 359 N.E.2d
696 (N.Y. 1976).
52. See, e.g., People v. Fields, 631 N.E.2d 303 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994); State v. Sanders,
634 S.W.2d 525 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982); State v. Moran, 444 A.2d 879 (Vt. 1982).
53. FED. R. EvID. 411.
54. Similarly, in criminal cases, where everybody knows who's going to pay the pen-
alty, the jury is instructed that in deciding on guilt it may not consider how much the de-
fendant will be punished if convicted. See, e.g., Rogers v. United States, 422 U.S. 35, 40
(1975). Cf Shannon v. United States, 512 U.S. 573 (1994) (jury need not be informed of
the consequences of a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity).
55. Alan Calnan, The Insurance Exclusionary Rule Revisited: Are Reports of Its De-
mise Exaggerated?, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 1177, 1177 (1991).
56. Ignoring the "technical" amendment in 1987, to remove masculine pronouns.
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seem to agree that there is no legitimate reason for jurors to hear
about insurance, and that if they do they might be tempted to find for
the plaintiff even if the defendant is not really liable, on the theory
that a poor, injured accident victim needs money more than a rich in-
surance company.
Most commentators, by contrast, criticize the rule, sometimes
scathingly. The standard criticism runs something like this: (1) Ad-
mittedly insurance has little or no probative value on any issue a jury
might have to decide. 7 (2) However, it is unclear that mentioning
insurance does much harm. There is some empirical evidence of bias
against insurance companies and other deep-pocket defendants, but
overall, the data are not overwhelming." Besides, insurance is now
so prevalent that most jurors no doubt assume that defendants are in-
sured. 9 If so, the only parties affected by the rule are the minority of
uninsured defendants who might be hurt by the absence of any refer-
ence to insurance. (3) In any case, everybody knows that plaintiffs'
attorneys frequently circumvent the rule and raise the issue of insur-
ance, ostensibly for some other permissible purpose, but in fact be-
cause they want to provoke the improper "deep-pocket" bias that
judges fear.6' (4) Despite its inefficacy-or perhaps precisely be-
cause it's so easy to bypass-the rule generates manipulation, argu-
ment, error, and reversal. In short it "has become a hollow shell, ex-
pensive to maintain and of doubtful utility."6
Moreover, to the extent that Rule 411 does work, it is decep-
tive.62 If the defendant is insured, the insurance company, for all sig-
57. See, e.g., CHARLES MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 201, at 852 (4th
ed. 1992).
58. Compare Dale Broeder, The University of Chicago Jury Project, 38 NEB. L. REV.
744, 753-54 (1959) (mock jurors exposed to information about insurance awarded higher
damages), with Valerie P. Hans & William Lofquist Jurors' Judgments of Business Li-
ability in Tort Cases: Implications for the Litigation Explosion Debate, 26 LAW & Soc'Y
REV. 85 (1992) (jurors skeptical of claims against business defendants, and concerned to
control damage award) and Elizabeth Loftus, Insurance Advertising and Jury Awards, 65
A.B.A. J. 68 (1979) (mock jurors exposed to insurance information awarded lower dam-
ages).
59. See Calnan, supra note 55, at 1189-90.
60. Four avenues for raising the issue of insurance are discussed repeatedly: (1) pro-
spective jurors may be asked on voir dire about connections to the insurance industry,
including stock ownership; (2) insurance may be brought up for some permissible pur-
pose-typically to show ownership or control of a vehicle or of premises, or to impeach a
witness (for example, an investigator) who is employed by the defendant's insurer; (3)
insurance is sometimes mentioned in a pre-trial admission by the defendant, or in an ad-
missible document; and (4) witnesses occasionally mention insurance in response to ques-
tions that are not specifically addressed to that issue. See id. at 1183-88; MCCORMICK,
supra note 57, § 201, at 853-56.
61. MCCORMICK, supra note 57, § 201, at 858.
62. See Leon Green, Blindfolding the Jury, 33 TEX. L. REV. 157, 162-63 (1957);
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nificant purposes, is the real party in interest. Why should an insur-
ance company be allowed to masquerade as an impecunious individ-
ual? Other corporate defendants-manufacturers in products liabil-
ity cases, for example-don't have that option. The fact that the
wealth of a party may affect jury verdicts does not in itself justify this
charade. Even if we knew for sure that juries treat corporate defen-
dants more harshly than individuals, it would not follow that insur-
ance companies and other corporations are treated unfairly. It is
equally possible that individual defendants are unfairly favored at the
expense of the plaintiffs who sue them. Rather than strive with
mixed success to keep jurors ignorant, wouldn't it make more sense
to let them know who's really who, and to instruct them not to take
the economic status of either party into account?
In practice, Rule 411 remains in effect. That means that in a
civil case with an insured defendant, the jurors might hear about in-
surance or they might not. If they do, it is likely to be a passing ref-
erence; if they do not, they may or may not think about it on their
own. Either way, it is hard to believe that the exclusion of evidence
of liability insurance is a big deal. Rule 411 is a well-defined rule ad-
dressed to an isolated aspect of the trial process. It works or it
doesn't, but its implications are limited.
In the world outside the courtroom, however, insurance is the
engine that powers civil litigation in almost every respect. Liability
insurance is not an occasional fortuitous event. On the contrary, the
vast majority of civil defendants who go to trial are insured. For ex-
ample, a survey of defense attorneys in 303 civil trials in California
Superior Courts in 1990-91 found that 81% of the defendants were
insured.63 Significantly, the minority of uninsured defendants were
mostly "deep-pocket" entities in their own right: large companies
(21% uninsured) and government entities (67% uninsured). 4 Those
defendants who stood to gain from Rule 411-individuals and small
companies-were insured in 96% and 91% of their trials, respec-
tively.65
Insurance companies are not merely responsible for damages in
civil cases; they also pay for the legal defense.' As an incident of its
duty to defend, the insurer almost always chooses the lawyer who
represents the insured in court. In most cases, insurers also have the
power to settle claims within the policy limits without the consent of
22 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM JR.. FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 5263 at 434-35 (1980).
63. See Gross & Syverud. supra note 6, at 21 tbl.11.
64. See id.
65. See id.
66. See id. at 25 tbl.14.
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the nominal defendant.67 Given this structure, it's no surprise that
civil defense counsel are widely known-indeed, describe them-
selves-as "insurance counsel." They belong to the Federation of In-
surance Counsel or the International Association of Insurance Coun-
sel, they subscribe to Insurance Counsel Journal, and so forth. But in
court all this is taboo.
The importance of insurance in civil litigation is not restricted to
the defense. Almost all civil plaintiffs are represented by lawyers
who are paid on a contingency-fee basis. For example, 94% of all
plaintiffs in California Superior Court Civil trials in 1990-91 paid
their attorneys entirely on a contingent basis, including 96% of indi-
vidual plaintiffs and 99% of plaintiffs in personal injury cases. 68 Be-
cause plaintiffs' lawyers are paid from the recoveries they obtain, i-
ability insurance-the dominant source of damage payments in civil
litigation-is the essential mechanism for financing the plaintiffs' bar
as well as the defense bar. Also, plaintiffs' lawyers, who are not paid
if they do not recover damages, have no interest in suing defendants
who cannot pay substantial judgments. As a result, with the excep-
tion of large companies, governmental entities, and occasional rich
individuals, uninsured defendants are rarely sued.69 (And if they are
sued, they cannot afford to defend themselves, so the law suits almost
never go to trial.) On the other hand, if potential plaintiffs start to
buy insurance against an unlikely liability risk-clergy malpractice,
for example-that in itself may generate litigation, and increase the
likelihood of being sued.7'
The centrality of liability insurance to civil litigation is codified
in rule 26(a)(1)(D) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which
provides:
[A] party shall, without awaiting a discovery request, provide to
other parties: ... for inspection and copying... any insurance
agreement under which any person carrying on an insurance busi-
ness may be liable to satisfy part or all of a judgment which may be
entered in the action ....
The rule that liability insurance is inadmissible to prove fault does
not, of course, mean that insurance contracts are immune from dis-
67. See Kent D. Syverud, The Duty to Settle, 76 VA. L. REV. 1113, 1118-19, 1172-85
(1990). The major exception is medical malpractice, where many liability policies require
that the insured doctor consent to any settlement. See Gross & Syverud, supra note 6, at
58-59; see also Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Getting to No: A Study of Settlement
Negotiations and the Selection of Cases for Trial, 90 MICH. L. REV. 319,360-61 (1991).
68. See Gross & Syverud, supra note 6, at 16 tbls.4 & 5. See also HERBERT
KRITZER, THE JUSTICE BROKER: LAwYERS AND ORDINARY LITIGATION 58-59 (1990).
69. See Gross & Syverud, supra note 6, at 51-52; see also Kent D. Syverud, On the
Demand for Liability Insurance, 72 TEx. L. REV. 1629,1634 (1994).
70. See Svyerud, supra note 69, at 1638.
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covery. Rule 26(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure sets
the standard for discoverability considerability lower, merely requir-
ing that "the information sought appears reasonably calculated to
lead to the discovery of admissible evidence." But the possibility that
information about liability insurance may "lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence" does not explaing this blanket rule requiring
unsolicited disclosure of the text of any insurance policy that might
pay for any alleged damages. The real justification is different: Be-
cause the insurer is the plaintiff's real opponent, and the insurance
policy is the real asset in dispute, settlement negotiations will be
more efficient if we acknowledge who's really handling the defense,
and disclose how much money is at stake and on what terms.7'
Finally, insurance has become a central normative issue in de-
bates and litigation over the extent of civil liability in tort. On some
issues, liability insurance has been an explicit consideration in one
form or another. Consider two examples: (1) Most of the cases ab-
rogating intrafamilial tort immunity rely in part on the argument that
the widespread availability of liability insurance transforms the typi-
cal lawsuit between family members into a claim by a member of the
family against an insurance company-a shift that undermines the
argument that the tort suits among close relatives destroy family
harmony. 2 (2) More recently, several scholars have argued that tort
liability for pain and suffering amounts to a form of compulsory in-
surance for such damages, which consumers pay for through higher
prices for products that are the subject of products liability suits,
higher medical fees to finance higher malpractice premiums by doc-
tors, and so forth. These scholars further argue that because con-
sumers do not voluntarily insure themselves directly against such
non-pecuniary damages (although they do insure against the eco-
nomic consequences of accidents or disease, such as lost income or
medical expenses), the law should not impose this type of "insur-
ance" on them in the guise of tort liability.73
71. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee's note on 1970 amendment.
72. See, e.g., Gelbman v. Gelbman, 245 N.E.2d 192, 193-94 (N.Y. 1969) ("Such [com-
pulsory automobile liability] insurance effectively removes the argument favoring contin-
ued family harmony as a basis for prohibiting suit. The present litigation is in reality be-
tween the parent, passenger and her insurance carrier."). See also Baits v. Baits, 142
N.W.2d 66 (Minn. 1966); France v. A.P.A. Transport Corp., 267 A.2d 490 (N.J. 1970). See
generally W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 82,
at 595 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON].
73. See, e.g., George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law.
96 YALE L.J. 1521, 1546-47 (1987); STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
ACCIDENT LAW 228-231 (1987). But see Steven R. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, The Nonpe-
cuniary Costs of Accidents: Pain-and-Suffering Damages in Tort Law, 108 HARV. L. REV.
1785 (1995) (disputing the argument in the text on both empirical and normative
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In other contexts, the normative significance of liability insur-
ance is less explicit, but equally important. For example, Prosser and
Keeton challenge the claim that the great expansion in the scope of
liability for medical malpractice over the past 70 years was caused by
the concomitant spread of medical malpractice insurance. They ar-
gue that "[i]t would be quite as reasonable to say that the spread of
malpractice insurance itself is a consequence of the expanded liabil-
ity .... "7 That may be. But whatever its origins, the current system
of medical malpractice liability would have destroyed the practice of
medicine, if it weren't for liability insurance. How many people
would become anesthesiologists or obstetricians if ordinary negli-
gence in the treatment of any one of thousands of patients might
subject them to ruinous personal liability?
In short, liability insurance has become the heart of our system
of tort law. For the system as a whole, the availability of insurance-
actual or hypothetical-is an assumption around which the rules of
the game are organized. For an individual case, insurance, as a prac-
tical matter, is as much an element of a cause of action as negligence
or damages. From the point of view of the typical individual defen-
dant, a civil law suit is mostly the insurance company's headache; it is
a disaster that has been paid for in advance. From the point of view
of the typical personal-injury plaintiff, the task at hand is to find an
insurance policy that covers the accident in which she was injured,
and to get compensation from the insurer. That is the goal her attor-
ney will pursue in investigation, discovery, preparation, and settle-
ment negotiations; in all but the rarest cases, matters will end there.
But if the case happens to go to trial, the jury will hear a dispute
about fault and justice. These two descriptions are not entirely in-
compatible, but they certainly are not the same.
Conclusion
The official story is that a trial is about historical facts. The jury
is supposed to answer the question: What happened? That's all. But
that is not the only question that defines what a case is really about.
We also want to know: Who are we talking about? And who's going
to have to pay? The rules that exclude evidence on these basic ques-
tions embody two equally basic distortions.
If we really wanted to exclude character and propensity from
consideration at trial we would have to tell jurors something like this:
"Figure out what happened-what these people did-but pay no at-
tention to what sort of people they are, or to how likely people like
grounds).
74. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 72, § 82, at 589.
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that are to do such things." This would be quite a change. At best it
would be very hard to pull off, if anybody really wanted to try. In-
stead we have written a character evidence rule that purports to be
general and categorical, but we live by a much narrower set of restric-
tions that focus on a few contested areas-mostly, prior misconduct
by witnesses and criminal defendants.
Evidence of insurance, by contrast, can be successfully managed
within the existing rules. Rule 411 does not always work, but it does
sometimes, and it could be strengthened-or abandoned-without
changing trials in any fundamental way. Ultimately, the question,
"Who pays?" probably doesn't matter that much to jurors. They may
know the answer, or believe they do, and they might care about it,
but it is not necessary to their job. They can do their best to figure
out what happened and to decide how much it will cost without ad-
dressing that issue at all. But "Who pays?" matters enormously to
everybody who has a stake in the case, lawyers and parties alike. The
distortion here is not that the rule misrepresents practice at trial, but
that it is our routine practice-of which this rule is a part-to de-
scribe cases to juries in terms that are far different from those we use
when we deal with them among ourselves.
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